The government’s proposed Wholesale Contract for Difference (WCfD) does not end the Renewables Obligation (RO) for existing wind and solar farms. It offers them a new, state-backed fixed price for their market income, on top of RO support that continues in full.

The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero published its Wholesale Contracts for Difference consultation on 28 October 2026, with responses due by 9 December 2026. Its stated aim is to weaken the link between gas prices and electricity bills by moving existing low-carbon generators onto fixed-price contracts.

The proposal could easily be misconceived as a scheme to move older wind farms off the costly RO and onto cheaper terms. It is nothing of the kind. Read carefully, it is better described as a new subsidy for plant that already exists, aimed above all at sites whose RO support is about to expire and at sites that currently trade without subsidy.

Wholesale Contracts for Difference

Under the existing system, RO-supported generators receive wholesale electricity prices in addition to the ROC subsidy. The WCfD would swap a generator’s variable wholesale income for a fixed strike price. If the strike price is above the market reference price, the generator receives a top-up; if it is below the reference price, the generator pays back the difference. The mechanism follows the existing CfD framework. (Note that the reference price, the Intermittent Market Reference Price (IMRP), is a proxy for the day-ahead wholesale price and does not track the intraday price exactly, so generators may see unexpected gains and losses.)

The RO is untouched, and the consultation explicitly states that the WCfD “would apply only to wholesale market revenues and would not replace or extend existing RO support”, and that it “is not intended to be an extension, replacement or successor for the RO or any other government scheme or support”. The consultation’s Figure 2 shows RO revenue unchanged beside the newly fixed wholesale income. The RO’s annual cost to consumers and taxpayers is therefore unaffected by the lead proposal.

An optional “hybrid” scheme (Section 5) would let RO generators also exchange their remaining RO income for fixed payments, discounted against anticipated RO revenues, until their RO support ends. The government says this would introduce “significant additional complexity” and might wait until a new Fixed-Price Certificate system for ROCs, on which the government will consult later this year, is in place. It is a possibility, not the proposal. Given the difficulty of estimating future ROC values, the complexity would, as government says, be considerable. It seems unlikely to proceed.

The pool of eligible plant is large, though not all of it holds ROCs:

Plant Capacity (GW) Sites
RO-accredited 26.2 1,981
- of which onshore wind (incl. remote island) 11.2 528
- of which offshore wind (incl. floating) 6.6 35
- of which solar PV 6.9 858
Merchant (no current subsidy) 7.1 927
Total, no size threshold 33.2 2,908
Total, threshold above 5 MW 29.8 1,063

Source: consultation, Tables 2 and 3; figures are the government’s upper estimates. Run-of-river hydro, landfill gas and tidal stream account for the remaining RO capacity.

Wind is about 17.8 GW (68%) of the RO capacity. Legacy nuclear plant may also be offered a contract, possibly through bilateral negotiation rather than auction. The auction would run towards the end of 2027, with contracts of 5 or 10 years assumed to be awarded in 2028.


Consumer Benefits?

A fixed-price swap as is proposed protects consumers against price spikes, and they pay for that protection whenever wholesale electricity prices are low. When wholesale prices are above the strike price, generators pay back and consumers gain. When prices are below it, consumers pay generators a top-up through the CfD supplier levy on bills.

The government expects prices to fall. The consultation states: “We expect average wholesale electricity prices to fall over time as renewables penetration increases.” If that forecast is right, the contracts will on average run in the generators’ favour, and the scheme will be a net cost to billpayers over its life.

The analytical annex is candid about this. It says the WCfD “could result in bill savings in earlier years” but “higher consumer bills in later years than under the counterfactual”. Where strike prices are high and realised wholesale prices low, it judges that “consumer value for money is likely to be low”. It provides no monetised estimate of costs or benefits, explaining that “a qualitative assessment has been considered more appropriate than a monetised analysis”.

The government’s answer is that competition will drive strike prices down, because generators value certainty and will bid below their own wholesale price expectations. That may happen, but it is a hope, not a finding. The consultation asks bidders to tell it how large the discount might be (Question 22).

The Electricity Generator Levy

In April 2026 the government raised the Electricity Generator Levy (EGL) rate from 45% to 55% and extended it beyond its scheduled end in 2028. The Budget confirmed that it will now last “for the duration of the longest WCfD contracts”, and that a generator holding a WCfD will be exempt for the length of its contract.

The EGL is charged on exceptional receipts above a benchmark price. It is not a tax on profits. Plant that stays in the market keeps paying it whenever prices are high; plant that signs a WCfD escapes it entirely.

Two consequences follow. First, more than half of generators’ exceptional receipts above the benchmark is already captured by the levy, for the Treasury. Moving generators onto contracts transfers that upside from the Exchequer to billpayers; it does not create new value. Second, the Treasury forgoes EGL receipts on every contracted megawatt-hour. Neither the consultation nor its annex puts a figure on this.

The government says the levy changes are intended to keep “incentives for generators to participate in the WCfD and bid competitively”. A separate consultation on the post-2028 design of the EGL will follow.

New Subsidies for RO-Accredited Generators and Merchant Generators

The scheme’s real beneficiaries are generators facing the end of their RO support and those now trading unsubsidised as merchant generators. RO accreditation periods begin to expire from March 2027, and the last run until 2037. After that, a plant depends on the wholesale market alone.

The consultation is open about the commercial pressures. It notes owners’ concerns about “ageing equipment, increasing operating costs, changing market conditions and uncertainty over future wholesale revenues”. It then asks RO generators whether their assets will “remain commercially viable after RO support ends and in the absence of a WCfD” (Question 20). It asks all generators whether a WCfD would change decisions to “extend the operational life” of their plant, refurbish, repower or “defer decommissioning” (Question 23).

The government calls life extension a “secondary benefit” and insists the scheme is “not intended to be a successor to the RO”. But, objectively, offering a 5- or 10-year price floor to plant leaving the RO can only be construed as a successor subsidy, whatever its formal purpose. The same is true of the 7.1 GW of merchant plant on 927 sites: it currently carries its own market risk but is being offered the opportunity of handing that risk to billpayers.

None of this buys new capacity. Every eligible asset must be “operational at the point of application”. Consumers would be underwriting the income of generation that already exists.

The government’s own legal framing points the same way. It commits to ensuring the WCfD is “consistent with the requirements of the Subsidy Control Act 2022” and “does not result in undue compensation”. The Act governs subsidies, and the consultation itself speaks of “any support provided through the WCfD”.

Transparency

The government is considering running the WCfD auction without publishing either the maximum strike prices or the budget. In every CfD round so far, an Administrative Strike Price (ASP) has capped what each technology can be paid, and a published budget has limited total spend.

For the WCfD, the consultation says: “We are therefore considering whether to refrain from publishing either or both ASPs or budgets for the WCfD allocation.” Instead, the Secretary of State would “view the anonymised bid stack and determine final budgets based on the competitiveness of bids” (pp. 36–37). Figure 3 sets out a process whose first step reads: “Budget and ASPs are not published prior to auction.”

The government accepts that this removes a protection. It says “the lack of a backstop that a published ASP would provide would be mitigated by this flexibility”. It is also consulting on removing the legal requirement in Regulation 13B of the CfD Allocation Regulations to publish the ASP (pp. 50–51; Question 25).

The auction design compounds the concern. It would be pay-as-clear: every winning bidder receives the price set by the highest accepted bid, not its own. Whether strike prices are indexed to inflation (none, partial or full CPI) is also undecided. Billpayers would be underwriting contracts covering up to 33.2 GW of plant for as long as a decade, with less public information about price and volume than any CfD round to date.

Costs Beyond the Contract

The consultation itself identifies several ways the scheme could raise system costs, and leaves each unresolved.

  • Levy recovery. The WCfD would be funded through the existing CfD supplier levy, which is recovered through consumers’ electricity bills. Energy-intensive industries and interconnector exports are exempt, which places “a higher proportion onto [other, mainly domestic] consumers”. Suppliers say levy costs are hard to forecast, and may add “risk premiums in tariffs, increasing costs for consumers”.
  • Weaker price signals. CfD supplier levy payments are highest on windy days, when wholesale prices are lowest. The consultation warns that this blunts the case for time-of-use tariffs and flexible demand, “at a time when the system needs more flexibility”.
  • Constraint costs. A WCfD generator would build its top-up into its bid price to be turned down in the Balancing Mechanism. When wholesale prices are below strike prices, “constraint management will be more expensive”. Constraints tend to occur in high-wind, low-price periods, which is precisely when that applies.
  • Negative prices. Under the existing negative pricing rule, generators could still sell at negative intraday prices if the day-ahead reference price was zero or higher and collect payments on metered output. For RO plant, which would still earn ROCs on every megawatt-hour generated, the incentive is stronger still. The consultation says a WCfD “could increase the volume of output offered at negative intraday prices”, which is just when price signals should be encouraging generators to reduce output.
  • Forward market liquidity. Contracted generators would trade at day-ahead, which could reduce the long-term contracts that suppliers and businesses use to hedge.

The consultation is asking respondents for evidence on all of these. None is costed.

Conclusion

Stripped of its framing, the Wholesale CfD is a new, state-backed price guarantee for existing plant. It is most valuable to wind and solar farms coming to the end of their RO support, and to those now trading as merchant plant without subsidy. For plant still within its RO period, it comes on top of the RO, not instead of it.

The government’s own documents show where the money is expected to flow. They forecast falling wholesale prices and warn of higher bills in later years, while declining to monetise the costs. Over the life of the contracts, the flow is from billpayers to generators, with the Treasury forgoing levy receipts as well.

Protection against another gas price shock has real value, and consumers may reasonably want some of it. But the price of that insurance should be public, and so should the maximum the government is prepared to require consumers to pay. Respondents to the consultation, which closes on 9 December 2026, should press for three things: a monetised assessment of costs under realistic price scenarios; published Administrative Strike Prices and budgets; and a clear statement of the Electricity Generator Levy revenue forgone.